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Abstract 
The problems of identity and legitimacy in the EU are significant, but tangentially 
interconnected.  The problems for EU identity derive not solely from the fact that European 
citizens have not developed much sense of being European because they have not been doing a 
lot in the EU; it is also that national elites have not been saying much about what the EU has 
been doing—except in moments of crisis.  The problems for legitimacy derive not only from the 
ways in which the EU works—with more emphasis on ‘output’ for the people and ‘throughput’ 
with’ the people than ‘input’ by and of the people.  It is also that the EU’s development challenges 
nationally constructed identities at the same time that it alters the traditional workings of 
national democracy.  And this in turn adds to problems for citizen identification with the EU 
and their perceptions of its legitimacy.   So the question is:  would politicizing the EU help build 
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INTRODUCTION1
The problems of identity and legitimacy in the EU have been debated at great length and 
from just about every angle and discipline possible (see also Schild 2001; Herrmann, Risse and 
Brewer 2004; McLaren 2006; Lucarelli et al. 2010).  But two sets of questions remain largely 
unexplored.  The first set relates to how European nation-states build their own political 
identity as nation-states and as member-states in the EU, and to how such political identity 
constructions in turn affect the EU political identity of their citizens.  The second set of 
questions relates to how closely EU political legitimacy is linked to identity, and whether 
further politicization of the EU would solve the problems of identity and/or legitimacy. 
 
 
In what follows, I do not define identity in any great detail but rather seek to show that we 
miss a vital element in the construction of identity if we fail to recognize that it not only 
involves a sense of belonging to Europe and active engagement in Europe but also that it 
demands communication about Europe.  European identity is established not just by the ways 
in which member-state elites and citizens self-identify as being European or by the extent to 
which they are engaged in doing things European but also by what they are saying about 
Europe as they engage with Europe and identify themselves as European.   
 
Thus, I argue that the problems for identity in the EU derive not solely from the fact that 
European citizens—as opposed to elites—have not developed much sense of being European 
because they have not been doing a lot in the EU by contrast with their active engagement 
within their national polities, for which they also have a strong sense of identification.  It is 
that national elites have not been saying what the EU has been doing.  This is largely because 
they have been more focused on saying what they have been doing at the national level in 
order to reinforce national citizens’ sense of national identity.  All of this enhances citizens’ 
                                            
1 This paper extends the arguments made in “Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union:  Is more Politics 
the Answer?” forthcoming in  Debating Political Identity and Legitimacy in the European Union  eds. Sonia 
Lucarelli, Furio Cerutti and Vivien Schmidt  (London:  Routledge, 2010 forthcoming) Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 5 of 36 
identification with the nation-state and does nothing for their identification with the EU.  
And it also does little for citizens’ sense of the EU’s political legitimacy. 
 
The linkages between identity and legitimacy are not entirely straightforward, however.  
The two constitute separate processes of political construction.  Whereas the former involves 
the development of peoples’ shared sense of constituting a political community, the latter 
relates to peoples’ sense that the political institutions of that community along with the 
decisions emanating from it conform to accepted and acceptable standards.  These two 
processes are often inter-linked in the EU, as each may have an impact on the other in the 
building (or  undermining) of political identity or legitimacy.  But they are not always 
interrelated, since it is possible to build a European identity without enhancing the EU’s 
legitimacy and vice-versa.  Moreover, although a lack of European identity can certainly have 
an impact on EU legitimacy, EU legitimacy does not entirely depend on European citizens 
having a sense of European identity.  Rather, legitimacy also derives from separate perceptions 
of the democratic nature of the processes and outcomes of European Union level governance.  
Thus, even though it is the case that member-state elites and citizens do not have much self-
identification as Europeans, they nevertheless generally accept EU level processes and 
outcomes as politically legitimate.  And they may even do so where these raise specific 
legitimacy problems for their own member-states. 
 
The linkages between identity and legitimacy are further complicated by the multi-level 
nature of the European Union, in which the interaction effects go both ways.  They are not 
only bottom up, as just noted, with national level conceptions of identity and legitimacy 
affecting the development of EU identity and legitimacy, but also top-down, with the 
development of the EU itself having an impact on national level legitimacy as well as identity. 
This is because the European Union, by its very existence, has had a significant disruptive 
impact on its member-states’ traditional bases for national identity and democratic legitimacy.  
The development of the EU as a supranational entity above the nation-state challenges 
nationally constructed identities built on traditional conceptions of sovereignty and Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 6 of 36 
community at the same time that it alters the traditional workings of national democracies, 
thereby threatening long-standing procedural rules for and substantive ideas about national 
democratic legitimacy.  All of this in turn adds to problems for citizen identification with the 
EU and their perceptions of its democratic legitimacy, in particular when national elites fail to 
recognize let alone communicate about or constructively deal with these issues.   
 
The analytic framework used in the first part of this essay is what I call ‘discursive 
institutionalism,’ which focuses on the substantive content of ideas and the interactive 
processes of discourse in institutional context (Schmidt 2002, 2006, 2008, 2009a).  In political 
science, it is close to what international relations theorists term ‘constructivism’ (Wendt 1995, 
Risse 2000) or ‘discourse analysis (Diez 2001), what comparative politics specialists call the 
‘ideational turn’ (Blyth 1997), and what political philosophers consider in terms of ‘reflexive’ 
theory—so long as it is noted that my emphasis is on theoretical evaluation of ‘what is’ rather 
than normative idealization of ‘what ought to be.’   The concerns of this essay are to elucidate 
not just ideas about identity (being) and legitimacy but also the interactive processes of 
discourse (saying) about identity and legitimacy, or ‘what is said to whom where when how 
and why,’ that serve to reconstruct such ideas in processes of communicative interaction.  
 
In political elites’ identity-building discourse, much depends upon the substantive content 
of their ideas, including the quality of the narrative or the framing of the issues that are key to 
establishing identity (Diez Medrano 2003; Bruter 2004; Eder 2010).  The discourse also 
depends, however, upon whether elites’ cognitive arguments speak sufficiently to the necessity 
of what they are doing  in building the nation or the EU and whether their normative 
arguments speak persuasively to its appropriateness (March and Olsen 1989) by resonating 
with long-standing and/or newly emerging values related to citizen’s sense of being a part of 
the nation.  
 
The discursive interactions through which such ideas are generated and legitimized are 
also important.  These include not only the ‘coordinative’ discourse among policy actors, as Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 7 of 36 
they conceptualize, deliberate, and reach agreement on ideas developed in epistemic 
communities (Haas 1992), such as in the construction of the euro (Verdun 2000), or 
promoted by advocacy coalitions (Sabatier 1998) and conveyed by policy entrepreneurs 
(Fligstein and Mara-Drita 1996) in the creation of the Single Market.  Such interactions also 
consist of the ‘communicative’ discourse of political leaders with the public, in which ideas 
developed in the coordinative sphere are conveyed by political entrepreneurs and “ideational 
leaders” (Stiller 2007) for discussion, deliberation, and ‘communicative action’ (Habermas 
1989).  The public involved may include the ‘informed publics’ (Rein and Schön 1994) of 
interest groups, opinion leaders, and the media, the ‘strong publics’ constituted by 
parliamentary actors (Eriksen and Fossum 2002), or the more general public of citizens.   
 
In the EU, whereas there has been a long-standing, elaborate top-to-top coordinative 
discourse among policy elites in the EU policymaking process, the communicative discourse 
has generally been thin and top-down, from political elites to general publics, with relatively 
little bottom-up construction of citizen ideas or discourse about Europe except at defining 
moments, on accession to the EU or with Treaties that require referenda.  This lack of saying, I 
will argue, is at least partly responsible for EU citizens’ lack of a sense of being European and 
for their increasing questioning of the legitimacy of the EU, despite a lot of elite (but not 
citizen) doing over the past sixty years in the construction of the European Union. 
 
The second part of the essay, on EU legitimacy, is a mix of approaches.  Here we add to a 
discursive institutionalist focus on the interactive construction of legitimacy through the 
logics of communication in the EU’s deliberative sphere a focus on the institutional forms and 
practices of the EU, in which the framework for analysis is mainly historical and rational 
choice institutionalist, as scholars explore the historical logics of path dependent institutions 
and the rationalist logics of calculation in the EU’s institutions (see Scharpf 1997, 1999; 
Pierson 1996; Bulmer 1998, 2009). The paper here demonstrates that the problems for 
legitimacy are not only structural and path dependent, in the way the EU was and is 
institutionally organized, split between national and EU levels.  Nor are they mainly the result Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 8 of 36 
of the logic of rationalist interaction within the existing incentive structures.  They are also 
ideational and discursive, as leaders fail to legitimate and citizens fail to deliberate.  How 
citizens think and talk about the EU and its institutions, that is, their identities, values, and 
discourse, are as important for the democratic construction of legitimacy as are the 
democratic practices that infuse the institutions with legitimacy. 
   Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 9 of 36 
1. CONSTRUCTING IDENTITY IN EUROPE 
Constructing identity is a complex process in which a sense of belonging derives not only 
from the presence of a ‘we-feeling’ based on common values, culture, or ethnicity but also 
from citizens’ active participation in a political community and the articulation—generally by 
political elites—of what constitutes that identity.  This means that identity is a political 
construction that involves not just being  but also doing  and  saying.  In the EU, the 
complicating factor for all three such processes is that alongside nation-state identity 
construction is the building of member-state identity in Europe—which includes not only 
ideas about what member-states are doing in Europe but also their visions for Europe—and 
the development of citizen identity as European.  The problem for the EU is that citizens’ 
sense of being European has not developed significantly.  There are many reasons for this, as 
the other chapters in this volume make clear.  But one significant problem is that EU identity-
building discourse has been subordinated to national identity-building discourse about the 
nation-state as well as the member-state in Europe. 
 
By using the terms being, doing, and saying, I do not mean to suggest that these terms can 
easily be separated other than analytically.  Much the contrary, I separate them to show the 
problems that arise when they are separated.  Thus, I share with Furio Cerutti (2008, 2010) the 
notion that identity is not so much a state of being as a process of identification which leads to 
feelings of belonging, which is why doing things together is an integral part of the process of 
identification.  But I also suggest that doing is not enough, since awareness of what one is 
doing is necessary for the process of identification, and this comes largely from saying what 
citizens are doing.  The production and communication of narratives, then, in the sense 
elaborated by Klaus Eder (2010), is a necessary component for the creation of a collective 
identity.  But it is important to see narratives not solely as ideas about boundaries that help to 
define citizens’ identity—in terms of Eder’s third theory about identity.  Rather, narratives 
should also be seen as part of a deliberative process of the public sphere, in which the 
generation, communication, and contestation of such narratives contributes equally to the 
construction of identity—which includes what Eder has termed the second theory about Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 10 of 36 
identity, encompassing the Habermasian ‘normative identity theory,’ although here we eschew 
its normative components to define a more empirical, non-idealized approach to discourse 
and deliberation.  
1.1. Nation-State Identity 
Nation-state identity tends to begin with citizens’ sense of ‘nationhood,’ or that which 
binds them through ties of collective identity, shared culture and values, common language(s), 
historical memories, myths of origin, a sense of membership, and a sense of common destiny.  
These define a sense of being and belonging to a given country.   Identity is never only being, 
however, since any sense of being is often the result of long historical processes of doing 
together, which build a sense of belonging (Howorth 2000).  Doing is closely tied to notions of 
citizenship, the building blocks of which include social and political rights, participation, and 
belonging as part of a political community even more than of a cultural community (Bellamy 
2004), and therefore also naturally plays a legitimacy-building function (as we shall see 
below).  But even doing is not enough to ensure a sense of being.  Saying what citizens are 
doing together is also essential to developing a sense of being  (Schmidt 2006).   This is often 
seen as the job of political elites whose ‘communicative’ discourse to the general public is all 
about  providing the public with information about and legitimation for their governing 
practices and government projects.  But elites are not the only ones involved in saying what 
the polity is doing.  Citizens need also to be actively involved.  Habermas  (1996, p. 495) 
supports this view when he insists that political community need not be based primarily on 
ethno-cultural identity, or being, but rather on “the practices of citizens who exercise their 
rights to participation and communication,” that is, on doing and saying.  Politics, in other 
words, is also very important to creating a sense of identity not just through acting together, 
say, in the process of voting, but also through public deliberation about what one should do.   
 
The state has naturally taken  an active role in constructing such a sense of national 
identity or ‘imagined political community,’ by using mass communication, mass education, 
historiography, and conscription to consolidate the nation (Anderson 1991, pp. 6-7).   State-Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 11 of 36 
centered elites seek to build a sense of identity in citizens by disseminating ideas about 
identity both directly, through their own communicative discourse to the general public, and 
indirectly, through the institutional structures created for the dissemination of ideas about 
that identity.   State institutionalization of collective memories through symbols and 
monuments are also important in the creation of ‘realms of memory’ (Nora 1997) while 
‘institutional memories’ are the ways in which states may seek to influence public 
understandings of the past, sometimes in opposition to ‘collective memories,’ in order to 
promote public acceptance of its policies in the present (Lebow 2006). 
 
Such national identity building is a constant process of construction.  In recent years, EU 
member-state leaders have engaged in a lot of discourse about national identity in response to 
a sense of crisis brought on not just by Europeanization but by internal transformations 
involving institutional reforms relating to devolution and changes in the make-up of the 
population, related in particular to immigration.  In the UK, for example, the identity crisis 
has centered on devolution, and concerns about the unraveling of the very idea of union, in 
particular as increasing numbers of Scots in particular have favored independence.  Prime 
Minister Gordon Brown’s effort to reinforce patriotism by emphasizing the sense of 
‘Britishness’ went so far as to propose inventing a motto akin to France’s ‘liberté, égalité, 
fraternité’ to be deliberated and voted on by a committee of citizens.  No surprise that this 
proved the butt of innumerable jokes, including a contest by The Times of London (Nov. 22, 
2007) which came up with the winning motto:  “No motto please, we’re British” as well as the 
very telling “At least we’re not French.”   In France, by contrast, the identity crisis has focused 
on the nature of republican citizenship and laïcité (secularism), in particular in response to 
the headscarf issue.  Immigration has also been closely linked to issues of identity, as in the 
presidential elections campaign of 2007 when candidate Nicolas Sarkozy reframed the issue by 
claiming immigrants to be equally French, at the same time that he focused on the issue of 
‘national identity,’ promising to name a new ministry for Immigration, Integration, National 
Identity, and Development in Solidarity (developpement solidaire)—thereby capturing votes 
from the extreme right (and massively reducing the National Front’s constituency).  It is Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 12 of 36 
telling that two years later, the French Minister of the Interior announced the opening of a 
new national debate on identity and ‘what it means to be French’ (Le Monde 26 Oct, 2009). 
 
Other countries have been similarly concerned about immigration and how this affects 
questions of national identity and citizenship.  In the Netherlands, the very image of the 
country as a tolerant society has come into question, first raised in Pym Fortyn’s election 
campaign, when he argued for intolerance of the ‘intolerant’ (read Muslim immigrants) in 
order to  maintain a tolerant society.  Denmark has instituted the most draconian of 
immigration laws, largely because of the quid-pro-quo of the minority conservative 
government and the extreme right anti-immigration party, which relies on it to get its 
legislative program passed.  In Germany, questions of identity have divided the former East 
from the West not only with regard to postwar collective memories but also in the coming to 
terms with the Nazi past.  In Poland, the question of identity has split nationalist conservative 
Catholics, represented by the Kaczy ński twins, from center left secularists and former 
dissidents.  In Belgium, the dissolution of the country itself has been under debate, as 
increasing numbers of the Flemish favor cutting the French loose.   
 
Questions of national identity, in short, remain highly salient for national politicians and 
their constituents.  But this is the result of a wide range of pressures on national polities, 
globalization among them, and is not exclusively related to Europeanization.  
1.2. Member-State Identity in Europe 
National leaders lately have spent much more time focused on redefining national identity 
than of speaking of their country’s identity in Europe.  But all member-states have at one 
point or another developed a communicative discourse on Europe, if only at critical moments 
of accession or of treaty ratification.   The difficulty for the EU with regard to building a EU 
identity is not just that national leaders are busily engaged in the task of building national 
identity, and therefore are less likely to speak to the building of the EU.  It is also that there is a 
plurality of nationally imagined Europes, as the member-states imagine the EU through their Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 13 of 36 
own lenses of being, that is, in terms of national values and culture, and of doing in Europe, 
that is, in terms of their purposes and goals.  This has come out over the years in terms of 
what leaders have been saying about those purposes, thereby projecting to their citizens very 
different senses of being European (see Schmidt 2009c). 
 
These differing member-state identities in the EU have largely been framed by political 
leaders’ communicative discourses in response to the need to build legitimacy for the EU, in 
particular with regard to legitimating national participation in the EU to national publics at 
defining moments such as accession or major treaty renegotiation.  But although such 
identities tend to be articulated most clearly by national political leaders, they should be 
understood as the product of much wider discourse and deliberation in society at large, with 
politicians in governing and opposition parties, civil servants, the media, informed publics, 
experts, interest groups, associations, social movements, and civil society contributing to the 
shaping of public attitudes as well as to political leaders’ own articulated narratives or stories.  
The ‘bottom-up’ nature of the discursive interactions have taken on increasing importance 
over time, as the EU has developed institutionally and the public has become more aware of 
the EU and what it does.   
 
In the early years, because the EU benefited from the ‘permissive consensus’ of national 
citizens in most member-states up until the 1990s, most member-states’ European identity up 
until then was largely defined and articulated by national policy and political elites without 
much public input.  Moreover, while the ‘coordinative’ discourse among and between policy 
elites at the EU and national level was highly elaborate across those earlier years of European 
construction and has continued to be, the ‘communicative’ discourse between political elites 
and the general public about the EU was not.   It is mainly since the 1990s that larger public 
debates have occurred, and these primarily during referenda or parliamentary votes 
surrounding the ratification of treaties on the EU’s institutional arrangements and policy 
reach.  These debates show that leaders’ top-down communicative discourses have 
increasingly been subject to bottom-up deliberative processes, not only through the media—as Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 14 of 36 
in the UK’s euroskeptic press—but also the general public, which has not only spoken loudly 
through its votes in referenda (as in the French and Dutch referenda on the Constitutional 
Treaty and the Irish on the Lisbon Treaty) and protest action in national capitals but also 
softly through its disaffection from the EU, as seen in surveys, polls, and movement to the 
extremes on the right or left (see below). Part of the problem is in the very nature of referenda, 
in which voters often don’t respond to the question asked, and may seek to punish national 
politicians or voice their concerns about the economy.  It is also because of the quality of the 
debate, in which political leaders’ discourse is often unpersuasive by comparison with that of 
the ‘no’ camp.  But equally importantly, it is about the fact that referenda on EU treaties are 
the only place for national citizens to voice their concerns directly about EU policies—and 
therefore serve as rallying points for unlikely alliances of citizens on the right concerned about 
sovereignty and identity issues, on the left about neo-liberalism, globalization, and their 
effects on the welfare state. 
 
Member-states’ sense of identity in the EU takes many forms, and speaks volumes to how 
much their national sense of identity influences how they see their actual role in the EU.  For 
example, French leaders’ communicative discourse beginning with de Gaulle  consistently 
emphasized the country’s political leadership in Europe, with all that that was to bring in 
terms of gains not only in economic interest but also in identity, by enhancing the country’s 
grandeur and continuing its civilizing mission with regard to the universal rights of man, 
thereby enabling them to ignore any challenges to ‘Republican state’ sovereignty. By contrast, 
the British pro-EU discourse since Macmillan consistently focused on the gains in economic 
interest while remaining silent on the losses to parliamentary sovereignty and the ‘historically 
established rights of Englishmen’—which helps explain the strength of the Euro-skeptics and 
Britain’s role as the EU’s ‘awkward partner.’  The German and Italian discourses have been 
much less concerned with questions of sovereignty and rights than of identity. German 
discourse since Adenauer portrayed Germany as France’s willing partner in leading Europe 
forward, with EU membership cast as enhancing a German-as-European national identity, 
out of a troubled past ‘being’ into an economically prosperous ‘doing.’  Italian discourse since Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 15 of 36 
De Gasperi presented Italy as the enthusiastic follower, with an Italian-as-European identity 
serving as a source of national pride, and with the EU itself serving as the rescue of the nation-
state (Schmidt 2009c). 
 
The problem today is that many of these long-standing discourses no longer say what 
these countries have been doing or what they have become—leaving national publics without 
clear guidance as to what to think.   French leaders’ problem, in particular under Chirac in the 
run-up to the 2005 referendum, was that while they continued to evoke the original vision of 
French leadership in Europe, as good for the economy and identity, the public saw that France 
was no longer leading Europe, felt in crisis over national identity, and increasingly blamed EU 
neo-liberalism for the country’s economic difficulties (Schmidt 2007).  During the referendum 
campaign, French elites themselves split on their support for European integration, in 
particular on the left—which is why the referendum was lost—but also on the right.  Only 
with President Sarkozy may this have been reversed, since he revived the discourse of French 
leadership in Europe as well as occasionally its reality, for example, during the French 
Presidency of the EU or the economic crisis of 2008.   The British, by contrast, struggle with 
their lack of any vision of Britain in Europe, since the discourse of economic interest does not 
respond to growing concerns about sovereignty and identity.  Worse, the idea of British 
separateness in Europe could very well lead to the reality of British separation from Europe—
in particular were the euroskeptic tendencies of the Conservative party to prevail during the 
Prime Ministership of Conservative party leader David Cameron.  Even the Germans and 
Italians have problems.  The Germans need to update their vision of ‘German-as-European’ in 
light of the changes related to unification and fading memories of World War II, especially 
since citizens increasingly question the benefits of membership and worry about the EU’s 
impact on the social market economy. This came to a head with the Greek sovereign debt 
crisis and loan bailout of May 2010, when the media discourse was all about ‘good’ Germans 
who saved and ‘bad’--read profligate--Greeks who spent—not to mention the further loan 
guarantee mechanism.  The Italians need to concern themselves not so much with their vision 
of Italy in Europe as with their implementation of European rules in Italy, since their pride in Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 16 of 36 
being European is likely to suffer if they do not do more to bring the country into conformity 
with EU law (Schmidt 2006; 2009c).   
 
The Dutch, moreover, although also largely pro-European, voted ‘no’ in the referendum 
on the Constitutional Treaty by an even larger margin than the French (NL 61% vs. FR 55%). 
The reasons had not only to do, as in France, with the ability of the ‘no’ camp to galvanize 
members of the electorate on the right and the left opposed to a disparate policy range of 
policies, but also because the ‘yes’ camp was unable to deliver a persuasive message in what 
was the first referendum ever for the Netherlands.  The problem was not only a lack of ideas 
and experience but also the invisibility of the EU to the citizens, given the absence of any 
discourse about the EU over the long-term.  Politicians had seemingly long assumed that it 
was the EU’s role to legitimize Europe, and when they talked (rarely) about the EU, they 
tended to use technocratic language, making it even more alien from the citizens and not of 
interest for the media to report on (WRR 2007).  The Irish ‘no’ in the first vote on the Lisbon 
Treaty resulted from a similar late and lame response of political leaders to a highly active and 
persuasive ‘no’ campaign, or even to anticipate the need to come in early, despite the fact that 
they had already had the experience of a ‘no’ vote for the Nice Treaty. 
 
For the new member-states, it is still too early to say what the long-standing 
communicative discourse will be.  But it is clear that under the Kaszyinski twins’ government, 
Poland outdid even Britain as the nay-saying awkward partner, with a discourse that 
highlighted threats to sovereignty and identity. In the Czech Republic, President Vaclav Klaus’ 
discourse has been all about national identity and sovereignty as threatened by the EU, which 
helps explains why he held up the signing of the Lisbon Treaty and doesn’t fly the EU flag 
from his residence, the Castle, claiming that it reminds him of the Soviet flag that was flown in 
the years of communism. Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 17 of 36 
1.3. Member-State Visions for Europe’s Identity 
Although the current twenty-seven member-states have at least twenty-seven different 
identities in the EU (see Nicolaïdis and Lacroix 2010; Risse 2010), their ideas about Europe’s 
identity can nevertheless be loosely divided into four basic, non-mutually-exclusive discourses 
about the EU (see Schmidt 2009c; following Sjursen 2007 for the first three kinds of discourse, 
Howorth 2007 for the fourth).  They include  a pragmatic discourse about the EU as a 
borderless problem-solving entity ensuring free markets and regional security, which is 
generally characteristic of the UK, Scandinavian countries, and the Central and Eastern 
European countries; a normative discourse about the EU as a bordered values-based 
community, most identified with France and Germany, but also Austria, Belgium, the 
Netherlands, Italy, and Luxembourg; a principled discourse about the EU as a border-free, 
rights-based post-national union, attributed to the Commission and to philosophers like 
Habermas (2001) and Beck and Grande (2007); and a strategic discourse about the EU as 
global actor ‘doing international relations differently’ through multilateralism, humanitarian 
aid, and peace keeping.  This has increasingly become the preferred discourse of member-state 
leaders generally, with the EU depicted as ‘project’ rather than  ‘process’ (Sarkozy) or as 
having ‘projects’ (Brown), in their efforts to respond to global challenges such as economic 
crisis, climate change, poverty, and terrorism.  But agreement on what to do can always be 
undermined by disagreements on what the EU is and how far it should expand—whether as 
widening free market, deepening values-based community, or democratizing rights-based 
union. 
 
The main question with regard to these differing visions of Europe is:  which of these 
would help constitute greater member-state identity in Europe?  All might.  But the first 
pragmatic discourse of problem-solving entity would provide the thinnest of identities, based 
on trading together or securing the European space, and leaving the borders amorphous, 
open, and undefined.  The second normative discourse of a values-based community probably 
would build the thickest of identities, since it most closely approximates the kind found in 
nation-states based on common values, solidarity, and clear borders.  The third principled Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 18 of 36 
discourse on constitutionalized rights also would establish a rather thin identity, given the lack 
of borders or values-based ‘we-feeling,’ notwithstanding Habermas’ (2001) suggestion that 
‘constitutional patriotism’ could be the basis for a common European identity.  The fourth 
strategic discourse arguably provides the bases for a thicker identity than the principled 
discourse, because it adds doing to the universalist being, by putting troops on the ground to 
guarantee human rights.  But putting troops on the ground often demands a greater sense of 
values-based community solidarity.  Without this, the first body-bags coming home could 
raise questions in member-states not only about ‘why we fight’ but also about why we are 
doing this as part of the EU in the first place, unless it were accompanied by a sufficiently 
persuasive legitimating discourse focused on building a strong ‘member-state in Europe’ 
identity.  This may help explain why, so far, most ESDP missions also go out under the UN 
flag. 
 
What is the spillover of national discourse and debate about member-state identity in the 
EU and member-state visions for the EU on citizens’ European identity?  Not much, it would 
appear, judging from the relatively low EU identity of European citizens.  
1.4. Citizen’s EU Identity 
In the EU, while citizens’ national identity, that is, their sense of being a national citizen is 
very ‘thick,’ their European identity in the sense of being European is comparatively thin.    
Only when EU identity is considered a composite of EU, national, and even regional level 
identification does anything close to a majority of member-state citizens appear to have a 
European identity.   The question, then, is why, despite a lot of elite doing at the EU level, that 
is, participating in the construction of the EU, have European citizens have not developed 
much of a sense of being European.   
 
Specialized surveys as well as social psychological experiments point to the growing sense 
of belonging to Europe (see Duchesne and Frognier 1995; Hermann, Brewer, and Risse 20004; 
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national  identity.  In-depth focus-group studies also demonstrate this, as in the study of 
French, British, and French-speaking Belgians, which takes note of citizens’ continuing sense 
of distance from the EU, and confusion about it (Duchesne et al. 2008a).   
 
Eurobarometer polls, moreover, have long shown that citizens’ sense of being European is 
very weak in any primary sense of belonging.  In 2004, the last time a question was directly 
asked about citizens’ sense of European identity, only 3.9% of citizens saw themselves as in the 
future having a European only identity and 8.8%, a European identity first, national second 
(Eurobarometer April 2004).  It was not even all that strong as a combination of national and 
European identity (43.3% of citizens), since it was lower than those who had a sense of 
national identity only (44%).   Identification with Europe also varied greatly among member-
states.  For the bigger member-states between 1996 and 2004, for example, Eurobarometer 
polls showed that the Germans went from a composite identity of national and European at 
35% in 1996 to the EU average of 46% in 2004; the British hovered around a low 30% for that 
entire time period; the Italians remained near to or above a high 60%; and the French near to 
or above an average 50% (Eurobarometers 1996-2004—see Schmidt 2006a, Ch. 4).   
 
Not much in all of this had changed by 2008, when the United Kingdom was the only EU 
member-state in which a relative majority of respondents to a Eurobarometer poll (EB 69 
2008) had a negative view of their country's membership in the European Union (32%).  Note 
that in this same poll, 73% of the Irish had a positive view of their country's membership in 
the EU, with 82% strongly believing that the country had on balance benefited from being a 
member of the EU.  But a majority nevertheless voted 'no' in the referendum on the Lisbon 
Treaty.  
 
As for the 12.7% or 47 million citizens who thought of themselves as being  mostly 
European (only European or European before national) in 2004, Neil Fligstein (2008) found 
that these were the elite, or upper classes, of Europe:  the best educated, most well-off, more 
politically left, and younger, who tended to travel more, used a second language, and Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 20 of 36 
interacted more with other Europeans.  He explained the lack of EU identity as the failure of 
these European elites to forge a cross-class alliance with the bulk of EU citizens at the lower 
echelons of society, building on Karl Deutsch’s analysis of the bases for nationalism.  And he 
concluded that the EU’s development would therefore be stalled in the future because this 
minimal sense of identity has not changed much over time.  But if European identity barely 
exists and hasn’t changed over time, and yet the EU has gone from almost nothing to a 
regional power, then we could conclude that national being not building to a European being 
does not necessarily affect EU doing.  The puzzle is why the inverse hasn’t worked.  With all 
the doing in the EU over the past sixty plus years, why has so little sense of being European 
developed among European citizens aside from the elites?  
  
The most basic answer is that while national elites have been doing a lot in the EU, they 
have been saying very little about what the EU has been doing, by contrast with what they 
have been saying about what they have themselves been doing at the national level or as 
national leaders at the EU level.  This makes it very difficult for national citizens to develop 
much sense of identification with Europe, given that they themselves have been doing 
relatively little in the EU.  Identity building among member-state citizens suffers from the 
EU’s lack of a common language, of a Europe-wide mass communication system, or of 
Europe-wide election campaigns and elections for EU level governance.  The only way in 
which citizens can participate directly, moreover, through elections for the European 
Parliament (EP), does comparatively little for identity-building, given that EP elections are 
second order elections in which national rather than EU issues are most often the focus, in 
which voting is often a referendum on the performance of national governments (especially in 
midterm), and in which abstention rates are on average very high compared to national 
elections (see Van der Eijk and Franklin 2004).  In addition, the EU itself lacks the levers of 
constraint used by states, such as conscription, forced language and educational policies, and 
so on, to build a sense of EU identity on its own.  Thus, the EU depends for the building of a 
sense of being European on national elites saying what the EU has been doing. 
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But why, then, have national political elites, who after all double as European elites, not 
been saying much about what the EU has been doing so as to increase a sense of EU being?  It 
is because national political elites have also been in the business of saying what the nation-
state has been doing in their efforts to reinforce a national sense of being, in particular in light 
of the encroachments of European integration (as noted above).  In addition, national leaders 
qua national leaders (as opposed to qua EU co-decision-makers in the Council) themselves 
have little incentive to speak of Europe.  Why expend scarce political resources on the EU 
when their political futures depend on national elections that are mainly focused on national 
issues?   This is why they focus on those issues for which they are fully responsible, talking less 
about the policy areas that have moved up to the EU and more about those they fully control, 
such as pensions, social policy, employment policy, purchasing power, crime in the streets, 
education, and so on.   
 
Studies of the European public sphere support this, showing that the amount of discussion 
of the EU by elites as reported in quality newspapers has tended to be quite low across time, 
and has not gone up significantly. The UK, predictably, made the fewest references to EU 
actors (going from 5% in 1990 to 8% in 2002), followed by France (11% to 13%) and Germany 
(8% to 13%), with Italy the highest (7% to 17%)  (Koopmans 2004, pp. 22-4).  But even in the 
Netherlands, where the increase in the discussion of European issues was spectacular (going 
from 16 percent in 1990 to 50 percent in 2002), only a quarter of the news commentaries (27 
percent) were written in consequence of a European event, with close to two-thirds (60 
percent) following domestic developments.  Thus, rather than Europeanization of Dutch 
politics, one can talk of the “Netherlandization” of European politics (de Beus and Mak, this 
volume).  
 
The paucity of discourse by political leaders about Europe also leads to the poverty of 
citizen knowledge about the EU, itself equally useful for building identity.  After all, if you 
don’t understand what you’re part of, how likely are you to feel a part of it?  Eurobarometer 
(2005) data on knowledge and understanding of the EU show that one in five respondents Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 22 of 36 
(19%) admitted to having no knowledge or almost none and one in two (51%) admitted to 
having a limited knowledge as opposed to only one in four (27%) claiming reasonable 
knowledge and only one in fifty (2%), great knowledge. This is corroborated by tests of that 
knowledge, in one of which only 29% knew that it was false to say that the last European 
Parliament election was in June 2002—presumably, the only ones who had voted in the 
elections in June 2004! 
 
This said, some countries are more likely to talk about the EU than others, which goes 
back to deeper questions of national views of the EU and its impact on questions of identity 
(elaborated above).  Where this is positive, as in Germany and Italy, one is more likely to find 
substantial discussion of the EU, along with legitimization of EU policies through reference to 
the EU, than in countries where there are greater concerns about the impact on sovereignty 
and identity—as in the UK and France or Poland and the Czech Republic.   
 
European identity, in short, just like national identity, is in a constant process of 
construction.  And to build a sense of being European requires not just active engagement in 
EU policies and institutions, or doing, but also communication about such activity, or saying.  
And  it has been the lack of communication about EU activity that has undermined the 
construction of European identity. 
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2. CONSTRUCTING EUROPEAN LEGITIMACY 
The lack of communication about EU activity also naturally has had an impact on 
legitimacy, since saying needs to be added to the processes of doing in order to ensure that the 
actions of the EU are not just acceptable but also accepted.  EU legitimacy, like EU identity, is 
very thin, and it too cannot be separated from the national level of democratic governance.  
But EU legitimacy is mainly tangentially connected to EU citizen identification.  Rather, it is 
dependent on perceptions of such ‘democratic’ qualities as the EU’s representativeness and 
responsiveness to citizens, whether indirect through national governments in the Council or 
direct through European parliamentary representation and/or interest intermediation; along 
with its accessibility, accountability, transparency, and effectiveness.   
 
The EU’s very institutional presence, however, makes for legitimacy problems in national 
politics and representative democracy more generally.  Although European integration is not 
responsible for the crisis in representative democracy, which is a more general problem (see 
Dalton 2003), it further contributes to the crisis in its member-states in ways not found in 
traditional nation-states.  This is because the EU’s member-states do not have the same 
flexibility in responding to citizen concerns as in a traditional nation-state at the same time 
that citizens do not have the same ability to express their concerns effectively through voting.  
Whereas in nation-states, citizen concerns can all be dealt with directly by nation-state 
governments, for better or worse, in EU member-states, many such concerns have to be dealt 
with through common policies in the EU, for better or worse.  And whereas the citizens of 
nation-states can make their approval or disapproval of national government policies clear 
directly, through voting their governments in or out, the citizens of the EU’s member-states 
cannot ‘vote the scoundrels out’ at the EU level.  As a result, they tend to hold national 
politicians accountable for EU policies for which they are not fully responsible, over which 
they often have little control, and to which they may not even be politically committed.   Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 24 of 36 
2.1. EU Democracy and Legitimacy 
The special problem of the EU, then, is related to the institutional realities of EU ‘politics’ 
and its impact on national politics.  EU politics has little in common with national politics, 
given its lack of a directly elected president, a strong legislature, and vigorous political parties 
and partisan competition.  At the EU level, national partisan politics has been marginalized, as 
party differences and left-right political contestation have been submerged by the general 
quest for consensus and compromise (Ladrech 2002, 2010).  Most importantly, however, EU 
politics is not really much about politics in the traditional sense of party and partisanship, 
since it is mostly about interests, whether national interests in the Council of Ministers, the 
public interest in the European Parliament, or organized interests in the Commission.  The 
upshot is that the EU consists largely of ‘policy without politics’ (Schmidt 2006, Ch. 4).    
 
Moreover, EU level ‘policy without politics’ makes for national ‘politics without policy,’ as 
increasing numbers of policies are removed from the national political arena to be transferred 
to the EU, leaving national citizens with little direct input on the EU-related policies that 
affect them, and only national politicians to hold to account for them (Schmidt 2006, Ch. 4).  
This has already had a variety of destabilizing effects on national politics, including citizen 
demobilization on the one hand or radicalization on the other  (Mair 2006; van der Eijk and 
Franklin 2004).  And even though increased interest-based politics may enhance associative 
democracy, it will do little or nothing for representative democracy.    
 
The problems for the EU with regard to democratic legitimacy are due in large measure to 
the fragmentation between EU and national levels of the legitimizing mechanisms that tend to 
operate simultaneously in any national democracy—political participation by  the people, 
citizen representation of  the people, effective governance for  the people and, adding a 
preposition to the classical formula, interest consultation with the people (Schmidt 2006, pp. 
21-29).  The EU level of governance is mainly characterized by governance for the people 
through effective rule-making—or ‘output’ legitimacy  (Scharpf 1999), in particular through 
the regulatory state (Majone 1998)—and by governance with the people through efficient, Working Paper No: 05/2010    Page 25 of 36 
accountable, and transparent decision-making plus and elaborate interest consultation 
process—or what I call ‘throughput’ legitimacy (Schmidt 2010).   The national level retains 
government by and of the people through political participation and citizen representation—
or ‘input’ legitimacy (Scharpf 1999).   
 
This split in legitimizing mechanisms does not in and of itself mean that the EU taken as a 
whole is democratically illegitimate (see Schmidt 2009b).   The EU gains input legitimacy by 
and  of the people indirectly through national governments’ indirect representation in the 
Council and their implementation of EU rules as well as directly by the (weaker) direct 
representation afforded by the European Parliament (which has been further strengthened by 
the Lisbon Treaty).  Moreover, the EU’s output governance for the people can be seen to serve 
an ‘efficiency promoting function’ (Menon and Weatherill 2008)—by doing things for the 
member-states that they cannot do on their own in areas such as the internal market, 
international trade negotiations, and the single currency.  Moreover, one could argue that 
output governance for  the people also comes out of what Polanyi (2001) in The Great 
Transformation  argued was the movement/countermovement process of social re-
equilibration of economic liberalization, with EU market-correcting alongside EU market-
making, as in European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings in such areas as gender equality, 
regional equality, environmental protection, and laws promoting family solidarity in the case 
of labour mobility (Caporaso and Tarrow 2008).  We could also show how the EU’s 
throughput governance with the people gives voice to a whole range of actors who may be 
marginalized in their national polities, and whose common interests are better expressed at 
the EU level, such as in gender equality and sexual harassment laws (Zippel 2006). 
 
But all these positive aspects of EU legitimacy notwithstanding, the split in legitimizing 
mechanisms causes significant problems for democratic politics in EU member states.  The 
central problem is that the EU’s ‘policy without politics’  leads to  depoliticized EU policy 
debates that do not resonate with European citizens, who are more used to the left/right 
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policies, especially because they have no direct say over them (Schmidt, 2006, pp. 163-8; 
Barbier, 2008, pp. 231-5).   This kind of saying what the EU is doing, in other words, building 
neither legitimacy nor identity, or being.  The problems with the lack of debate about real 
politics became clear with the controversy over the Bolkestein directive on services 
liberalization, which proposed to allow home-country rules to apply on a range of issues 
related to pay and social protection.  In the run-up to the referendum on the Constitutional 
Treaty in France, it  conjured up nightmares of ‘Polish plumbers’ taking French jobs and 
spurring a race to the bottom in wages and social protection, all of which contributed to the 
negative outcome of the vote (Schmidt, 2007).  Although the Commission’s services initiative, 
along with ECJ decisions in the Laval and Viking cases curtailing national unions’ rights to 
strike, could be seen positively from a EU level perspective as promoting a Polanyian, 
apolitical market-correcting governance for all Europeans, it can just as readily be seen 
negatively from a national level perspective as a politically neo-liberal post-Polanyian 
destruction of national labour and welfare systems (Höpner and Schäfer, 2007).   And all of 
this in turn raises questions about whether the EU really does govern effectively for the people. 
 
These examples illustrate two main theoretical drawbacks to ‘output’ legitimacy.  First, as 
Furio Cerutti  (2008, and this volume) has argued, performance-based legitimacy of the 
‘output’ variety is insufficient for legitimization, since outcomes also require a kind of 
‘Weberian legitimacy,’ by which he means the substantive values and principles guiding the 
performance, that make the performance valued.   This is at the heart of the legitimacy 
problems of recent Commission liberalizing directives and ECJ cases.  More generally, while 
the EU’s substantive legitimacy seemed assured in the early years, due to the ‘permissive 
consensus’ in which citizens largely ignored the EU and its outcomes, a ‘constraining 
dissensus’ has emerged in recent years (Hix 1999; Hooghe and Marks 1999; Van der Eijk and 
Franklin 1996; and Niedermayer and Sinnot 1995) along with the rise of euroskepticism.   
 
Second, the contested outcomes of the Commission and the ECJ, as non-majoritarian 
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national level, non-majoritarian institutions are legitimate because established by national 
political institutions that have the capacity to alter them if they so choose, and could thus be 
seen to operate in the ‘shadow of national politics.’   At the EU level, there is no such political 
balancing of non-majoritarian decisions.  The decision rules make it almost impossible to 
alter those decisions, let alone to change the non-majoritarian institutions themselves; and 
there is no political government that could force the issue—as in the US in the case of FDR’s 
threat to pack the Supreme Court if it did not stop ruling his decisions unconstitutional.   
 
Output democracy for the people is not the only democratic legitimizing mechanism in 
question, however.  ‘Input’ democracy by and of the people also is, as we have already seen, 
given the way in which the EU’s depoliticized ‘policy without politics’ has emptied national 
politics of substance.  The EU Commission and increasingly the European Parliament (EP) 
have attempted to remedy this problem via increased throughput legitimacy.  This involves 
not only greater transparency via more access to information but also more pluralist interest-
based consultation with the people, by bringing in more interest groups and members of ‘civil 
society,’ as a way to counterbalance the lack of governance by the people (Greenwood, 2007).  
But regardless of how open to public interest consultation with the people the EU may be, the 
problem for national citizens is that this kind of supranational policymaking is very far from 
the kind of input participation by and representation of the people they tend to see as the most 
legitimate.  And it is in any case not open to most of them, given the difficulties of 
transnational mobilization for most citizens. Even ‘civil society’ is not what it seems.  The 
problem with all such throughput decision-making processes with the people, whether at the 
global, EU, or even national level in big nation-states like the US is that ‘civil society’ is 
increasingly ‘expertocracy’ (Skocpol, 2004), and thus removed from actual citizens.  This 
means that governance with some of the people and possibly not for all of the people is meant 
to make up for the lack of governance by and of the people (Schmidt 2006, p. 28).   
 
How have EU leaders responded to this range of pressures on national politics and rising 
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ways that would serve to attenuate public concerns or ameliorate the legitimacy problems.  
Generally speaking, the Commission has consciously sought to depoliticize EU policy by 
presenting its initiatives in neutral or ‘reasonable’ language, and by using communications 
techniques such as its ‘Plan D’ for democracy (Barbier 2008, pp. 231-2).  National leaders have 
been perfectly happy with the depoliticized language of EU level ‘policy without politics’ 
because this leaves them free in their national capitals to put any kind of political ‘spin’ of the 
left, right, or centre on EU policies.   
 
As for what they say about those policies, rather than discourses legitimizing the transfer 
of decision-making responsibility upwards to the EU as the way to solve national, European, 
and global problems for  the people, national politicians have tended to engage mainly in 
blame-shifting and credit-taking.  On policy issues, national leaders tend to blame 
Europeanization for unpopular policies because “the EU made me do it” and to take credit for 
the popular ones without ever mentioning the EU—largely because this suited their short-
term electoral goals (Schmidt 2006, pp. 37-43).  On ‘polity’ issues, or the EU’s institutional 
impact on national democracy, national leaders have generally been silent—except at 
moments of treaty referenda, when it was too late, as we saw in France, the Netherlands, and 
Ireland.  As such, they have not even acknowledged the problems of decreasing national 
democratic access to decision-making, let alone attempted to remedy them. In all of these 
cases, national leaders only increase citizens’ sense of powerlessness in the face of 
supranational forces to which they must adapt, and over which they have no control.  And 
Commission officials only make it worse when, in pronouncements after referenda, they insist 
that they will go ahead regardless of voters’ views. 
 
It is only very recently that we have begun to see a shift in the discourse, as national 
leaders have been talking about the need for EU and global action to confront the major 
challenges of today.  The fact that EU leaders have been calling for global financial regulation, 
global action on climate change, poverty, terrorism, and more, are all essential elements of 
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solution. It certainly does nothing for throughput governance with the people with regard to 
increasing access beyond the expertocracy, or ‘pluralizing’ the EU. It does little for input 
governance  by  and  of  the people, which would require more ‘politicizing’ of EU level 
institutions.   And it does little to alleviate citizen concerns about the impact of EU economic 
policies on national socio-economic arrangements. 
2.2. EU Policy with Politics? 
So is the answer to EU legitimacy and identity problems to bring in more ‘policy with 
politics’ at the EU level?   There have been many proposals for political reform, too many to 
list let alone to go into detail here (for one, see Hix, 2008).  Most such proposals focus on 
increasing representative politics, or governance by and of the people at the EU level, mainly 
through more political competition in the European Parliament, Commission, and/or the 
Council.  The assumption is that more politics would produce citizens who would be doing 
more in the EU, through engagement in elections, and saying more about it to one another, 
via deliberation about the issues raised, thus building more of a European identity.   
 
But although such politicization speaks to citizen  ‘input’ by and of the people, it does not 
address the impact of the EU on ‘output’ for  the people.  There is little question that 
politicization could have negative effects on governing effectiveness for  the people, by 
introducing yet another source of division into deliberations already burdened by 
considerations of national, public, and special interests among the member-states (Majone, 
1998; Scharpf, 2003, 2007; Schmidt, 2006, p. 270).  Moreover, it could undermine the kind of 
trust that the Commission has garnered over the years by being seen as an impartial arbiter, 
above the political fray, focused on technical competence rather than on partisanship.  The 
end of ‘policy without politics’ could also lead to stalemates that would only increase citizens’ 
disaffection from and dissatisfaction with the EU.  This said, ‘policy with politics’, if done right, 
need not unduly affect governing effectiveness at the same time that it could have positive 
effects on citizens’ sense of identification with the EU and its political legitimacy. 
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Politicization, in any event, will be increasingly hard to avoid, given the awakening of the 
‘sleeping giant’ of cross-cutting cleavages in Member States, with the rise of splits between 
pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics in mainstream parties of the right and the left (van der Eijk 
and Franklin, 2004), and the likelihood of much more hotly contested, politicized EP elections 
than in the past, even if they remain second-order elections.  With the Lisbon Treaty, 
politicization is likely to go further, given the election by the European Parliament of the 
Commission President.  It is also possible to imagine political campaigns across Europe in EP 
elections, with primaries organized by the major EU political parties across Europe.  All of this 
could be a good thing for democracy if EU-wide political parties become stronger, if they 
produce platforms with ideas on policy and polity issues that resonate with citizens, and if this 
in turn produces substantive political debates across the EU about what it should do.   Exactly 
how the electoral politics would play itself out in practice remains in question, however.   
Although there are good arguments for increasing the majoritarian politics of the Council and 
the EP (Hix 2008), in particular to avoid the stalemates of extremely proportional 
representation systems, as in Italy prior to the 1990s and arguably also since 2006, the EU 
lacks the collective identity and legitimacy necessary for the kind of majoritarian one party 
rule of a Britain or a France.  It would do better with the kind of proportional representation 
system of a Germany in which, once the right-left polarization of elections campaigns is over, 
compromise and consensus-seeking rules, in particular at times of grand coalitions. 
 
The EU’s increasing legitimacy cannot be based on electoral politics alone, however. It 
needs to be linked to institutional reforms providing, for example, for greater EP involvement 
at the beginning stages of policy formulation. Reforms here could involve linking relevant EP 
members and committees to the Commission’s expert committees in the comitology process.  
Even without this, however, the Commission could lay out the political dimensions of its 
policy initiatives, rather than presenting them as purely technical, while the European 
Parliament could do more to debate the issues (Magnette, 2003; Schmidt, 2006, pp. 268-9). In 
addition, the EP could be more fully connected to national parliaments – and needs to be, way 
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national parliamentary engagement with EU issues, beyond the few that become topics of 
Europe-wide controversy, such as the services directive.  Greater citizen access to the EP either 
directly or through the national parliaments is another area crying out for reform, as the 
Lamassoure report (2008) made clear, since citizens don’t know their rights or how to ensure 
them through EU institutions. 
 
Another remedy to EU legitimacy problems would be through more pluralist politics. This 
is a national task as much as an EU level one, however. At the national level, political leaders’ 
discourse should make it clear to national publics that national governments are not the only 
voices which can speak for national interests and values, but that citizens – as opposed to just 
experts  –  can and should have more direct input into supranational decision-making. In 
addition to informing citizens of the pluralist nature of supranational governance with the 
people, they need to help citizens to organize themselves so as to gain access and influence in 
European decision-making  –  providing funding, information, and strategic advice –  as 
opposed to trying to avoid citizen involvement. Moreover, they need to put procedures into 
place to enable citizens to participate in the national formulation processes focused on EU 
decision-making. All of this would also afford the already activist citizens and social 
movements better access and input at both EU and national levels. 
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3. CONCLUSION 
In the European Union, EU level identity and legitimacy are closely bound up with 
member-state national identity and legitimacy as well as with member-state identity in Europe 
and visions for Europe, and depend in large measure on national leaders and publics speaking 
of Europe.  But because national leaders focus most of their energy on the national level, the 
EU level has been left wanting.  The result is that EU citizens’ sense of being European remains 
underdeveloped, in particular in light of how much the EU have been doing in recent years, 
which in turn creates problems for EU substantive legitimacy, even when its procedural 
legitimacy is not question.  Increasing EU policy with politics may produce some identity-
enhancing effects, if done carefully.  The main question remains, however, about whether we 
are putting the cart before the horse if politicization comes before identity or legitimacy.   If 
EU citizens have little sense of identity in the EU and increasingly question its legitimacy, then 
would politicizing the EU necessarily have the effect of building identity and legitimacy or of 
further undermining it? 
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